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Barriers to Knowing and Being Known: 









In this paper, we examine the barriers to, and possibilities of, recognizing individuals labelled intellectually 
disabled as producers and contributors to knowledge about their experiences. Through engaging perspectives 
within the fields of philosophy of education and disability studies, we examine contrasting research about the use 
of facilitated communication, an augmentative and alternative communication technique for teaching people with 
disabilities to communicate through pointing, or typing with support provided by a communication partner. We 
examine how researchers impose demands for the scientific validation of facilitated communication and use such 
demands to discredit autistic people identified with intellectual disabilities in their attempts to be recognized as 
knowers and producers of knowledge. Our analysis calls into question whether self-imposed limitations on 
contemporary knowledge production render educational research (in)capable of accepting forms of evidence that 
will facilitate the agency of those labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled and (in)capable of providing 
consumers of educational research access to knowledge that reflects the wide range of communicative, 






In an ideal world these questions would not need to be asked because a diagnosis of autism 
would not lead to branding a person as less than or inferior. Those who cannot speak or 
who have limited speech would not immediately be labeled “intellectually disabled” and 
“low functioning.” We would live in a society that would embrace diversity and welcome all 
people, regardless of race, culture, religion, neurology or disability. Our education system 
mirrors our society and in both, we come up short. (Zurcher-Long, 2019, p. 135) 
 
Communication is a fundamental human right. Yet for individuals who do not use speech to be 
understood, access to communication is often tenuous. An inability to speak has often been equated 
with an inability to think. Such presumptions of incompetence are based on assumptions that 
uncritically privilege  speech as a preferred mode of communication and expected means through 
which competence is demonstrated. In educational research and practice, people are commonly judged 
as un/intelligent based on the ways that they communicate. Cultural constructions of what intelligence 
looks and sounds like have contributed to the tendency for those who deviate from constructed norms 
of communication to be pushed to the margins of knowledge production, and to educational contexts 
with low expectations for academic achievement and social participation. Judgements of incompetence 
towards those who do not speak to communicate constitute ableism, or a form of prejudicial belief that 
unduly views disability as a deficit, often in comparison to culturally constructed ideas of normalcy 
(Ashby, 2010; Baglieri & Lalvani, 2019). Though self-advocates, scholars, activists, and allies have 





worked to highlight the inaccuracy of assumptions about people’s competence based on their means of 
communication, a propensity for individuals’ intelligence to be judged based on their communication 
persists and contributes to misunderstandings about their lived experiences. 
  This tendency to equate communicative competence with intellectual ability is particularly true of 
communication needs associated with disability labels that have historically been associated with 
measures of intelligence, such as autism or other intellectual and developmental disabilities. As Emma 
Zurcher-Long, an activist, writer, and public speaker who types to communicate, reminds us, 
conceptions of autism, intellectual disability, and access to communication are intertwined and impact 
one another. Autistic1 people who do not use speech as their preferred or most effective 
communication method are often labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled. This occurs formally 
through diagnostic assessments that rely on forms of communication, neurocognitive expression, 
motor planning, and behaviour that hinder the performance of some autistic individuals on 
assessments, therefore rendering them less likely to be regarded as intelligent (Courchesne, et al., 2015). 
 The use and results of such assessments make it seem as if intellectual disability is a discrete entity 
that people have. Yet, as Kliewer, Biklen and Petersen (2015) argue, intellectual disability is better 
understood as a metaphor for a global deficit in intelligence, a construct derived from and reinforced 
by the tests which claim to assess it. Constructions of intelligence are also upheld socially and culturally 
through normative expectations for behaviour and communication. These constructs, as Biklen and 
Kliewer (2006) note, are what we have made of them. The interconnected perceptions of autism, 
communication, and competence often render nonspeaking autistic people to be regarded as “disabled-
minded,” particularly in the absence of communication access or a shared understanding of alternative 
and non-spoken forms of communication. As Taylor (2021) notes, “To treat someone as disabled-
minded is to treat them as globally deficient in their capacity as a knower, and to treat that deficiency as 
arising from some objectively real fact about that person, rather than as a consequence of their social 
positioning.” Disabled-mindedness both “enables and rationalizes the treatment of labelled people as 
outside the community of knowers” (ibid., 2021). As we will argue in this paper, nonspeaking autistic 
peoples’ positioning as disabled-minded constitutes a form of prejudice that is used as a basis for 
invalidating the method through which some access communication, and ultimately to dismiss their 
contributions to knowledge about their own experiences. 
 Facilitated communication (FC) is a technique that involves teaching people who do not use 
speech reliably and who have movement differences to communicate by pointing, or typing with 
support provided by a communication partner, or facilitator (Biklen & Cardinal, 1997; Crossley, 1994). 
FC involves a combination of physical, emotional, and communicative support provided to an 
individual (i.e., the person typing) by a trained facilitator, also known as a communication partner 
(Crossley, 1994; Institute on Communication and Inclusion, 2000). In addition to verbal 
encouragement and prompts, supports provided by a facilitator may involve proprioceptive feedback in 
the form of backwards resistance to support stabilization, reduce impulsive movement, and/or support 
initiation. FC is fluid and progressive, with the goal of faded support and increased independence 
(Institute on Communication and Inclusion, 2000). Some people who have used FC have attained 
increased levels of independence and exert agency over their lives (Rossetti, et al., 2008; Rubin, et al., 
2001), including learning to type without any physical support from a facilitator (Ashby, et al., 2015; 
Rubin, et al., 2001). Some have developed the ability to read aloud their typed text and/or engage in 
short spoken conversations (Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2001; Kasa-Hendrickson, Broderick, & 
                                                
1 Language is an important and powerful choice. We intentionally use identity-first language to honour and affirm 
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Hanson, 2009). Others have been able to gain increased access to education, with some progressing to 
higher education (Ashby & Causton-Theoharis, 2012; Bennett, 2011; Biklen & Burke, 2006; McKee & 
Gomez, 2020; Peña, 2019). 
 Yet, FC remains controversial and has been dismissed by several researchers as pseudoscientific, 
with many of the studies cited above dismissed as unacceptable evidence. These researchers’ critiques 
of FC are rooted in a series of early studies that used controlled message-passing conditions to assess 
the authenticity of communication produced with the support of a facilitator (e.g., Bebko, Perry, & 
Bryson, 1996; Bomba, et al., 1996; Eberlin, et al., 1993; Shane & Kearns, 1994; Wheeler, et al., 1993). 
These studies failed to consistently prove that people using FC were authoring their own messages and 
some suggested instead that the facilitator was inadvertently influencing messages while providing 
physical support. The possibility of facilitator influence found in these early research studies draws into 
question whether the communication resulting from FC represents the actual thoughts and intentions 
of those who use the method, particularly under those testing conditions. Importantly, some critics of 
FC draw on the results of such message-passing studies to claim that FC always produces inauthentic 
communication and therefore is universally harmful to the lives of any individuals who use FC (Travers, 
Tincani, & Lang, 2014). These totalizing dismissals persist despite evidence from research using other 
methodologies and in other published media. 
 The leap from extrapolation of results from research studies to outright dismissal of the 
authenticity of communication from all users of FC poses dangers of its own. Critics not only argue 
that FC is not scientifically valid, but they are also aghast that anyone, anywhere, continues to have 
access to FC, and advocate that FC should cease to be offered as an option for communication support 
(Lilienfeld, et al., 2015; Travers, 2017, Wombles, 2014). The pushback against FC has in fact resulted in 
limiting access to the associated communication supports for students with disabilities, who already 
face limited options for communication access (Bennett, 2011). Advocacy against people having access 
to FC as an option for communication support is of particular concern given that those who have 
learned to communicate through FC have called into question assumptions about their capacity to 
think and the very nature of perceptions of autism and intellectual disability. Reflecting these 
experiences, an increasing focus on sensorimotor differences is gradually shifting understandings of the 
autistic experience away from a behavioural lens grounded in constructions of intellectual disability and 
neurotypical behaviours, to account for the role of movement, sensory, stress, and neurocognitive 
diversity that is both difficult to observe and may influence people’s performance, for example when 
they type to communicate (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013). Through the use of FC, individuals with 
limited or unreliable speech have demonstrated complex thoughts that exceed the intellectual capacity 
with which they were initially judged. Further, they have challenged the assumption that those who 
think, move, sense, and communicate in neurodivergent ways cannot be knowers, or knowledge 
producers (Biklen & Burke, 2006; Kliewer, Biklen, & Petersen, 2015). To deny the use of FC and 
dismiss the authenticity of those who type to communicate may restrict access to the very tools and 
resources which some people might use to defy the deficit-based assumptions through which they are 
described in research and wider society. 
 In this paper, we analyze arguments from researchers in education and social sciences who dismiss 
the use of FC and deny the authorship of persons typing, on the grounds that FC has been determined 
to be a scientifically invalid practice. Our purpose is to demonstrate how some researchers invoke self-
imposed conditions for producing knowledge to place limits on what counts as evidence, and in doing 
so, eclipse other documented evidence about autism, intelligence, and communication, as well as the 
lived experiences and contributions of nonspeaking autistic people who type to communicate. To do 
so, we examine critiques of FC and of the testimony made by those who type to communicate. We 
consider how researchers’ demands for narrow criteria to validate FC limits the acceptable 
methodological processes that could and do yield evidence about its impact. We further examine how 
demands for scientific validation of individuals’ communication serve as a prerequisite to believing that 
their thoughts are their own, thus providing a rationale to discredit autistic people who type to 
communicate in their attempts to be recognized as knowers and producers of knowledge. 





 We draw on Fricker’s (2007) work on epistemic injustice and Taylor’s (2018) work on epistemic 
agency to argue that that the dismissal of FC and research by, and about, people who type to 
communicate, perpetuates epistemic injustice by 1) denying the agency of nonspeaking autistic people 
and hindering their participation in producing knowledge, and 2) impacting the potential for others 
who are similarly situated to access future communication. We first examine the epistemological 
orientation towards empiricism in special education research, which serves as the foundation for 
dismissing the testimony of individuals who use FC and contributes to a continued gap in collective 
understanding about autism, intelligence, and communication. Then, we examine how researchers use a 
commitment to a specific kind of scientific validation to ground their dismissal of research of and by 
those who use FC. Finally, we consider the notion of presuming competence as a potential corrective 
virtue for addressing prejudicial judgements of credibility faced by nonspeaking autistic people. We 
examine critiques of the presumption of competence that invoke demands for empirical scientific 
validation, and consider how such demands may further limit the already diminished opportunities for 
nonspeaking autistic people who use, or could use, FC as a means to access communication and 
contribute knowledge about their lives. 
 
 
Epistemic Injustice: Denying the Agency of People Who Type to Communicate 
 
In philosophy, work on epistemic injustice examines how social groups are denied access to 
contributing knowledge about social institutions when their testimony is denied credibility and they are 
systematically excluded from knowledge production due to aspects of their social identity (Taylor, 
2018). As Fricker (2007) notes, “any epistemic injustice wrongs a speaker2 in his capacity as a subject of 
knowledge and thus in a capacity essential to human value” (p. 5). Thus, as Taylor (2018) has argued, 
epistemic injustices undermine individuals’ ability to enact epistemic agency – or to create and convey 
knowledge – particularly in academic research about and related to their lives. Fricker (2007) describes 
two distinct types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, in which in which prejudice yields a 
denial of a communicator’s testimonial credibility by a hearer3 (i.e., a recipient of communication), and 
hermeneutical injustice, in which there is a gap in interpretative resources used to make social 
experiences known within the collective understanding. 
 Fricker (ibid.) describes testimonial injustice as prejudice against a person, owing to their identity, 
that wrongs them in their capacity to be heard by another. Testimonial injustice commonly occurs 
when prejudice leads one to judge another’s credibility at a deficit, undermining the person’s capacity 
for reason and to give knowledge. Judging another’s testimony at a deficit occurs not only as a result of 
conscious discriminatory beliefs, but from the subtle influence of “identity prejudice,” discrimination 
based on the social identity of the person (ibid., p. 27). We argue that in the case of facilitated 
communication, this identity prejudice rests on ableist constructions of communication and 
conceptions of disabled-mindedness (Taylor, 2021). The consequences of testimonial injustice involves 
knowledge that is conveyed not being received, knowledge makers not being regarded as such, and the 
potential for the inhibition of self-development. 
 Fricker (2007) describes another form of epistemic injustice – hermeneutical injustice – as “the 
injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective 
understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resources” (p. 
155). The potential for hermeneutical injustice arises when there are insufficient resources for 
interpreting the testimony of social groups, without the interference of prejudice having to do with 
judgements of credibility. Fricker (ibid.) argues that judgements of credibility deficits can rise to the 
                                                
2 We interpret “speaker” in this work broadly to represent all of the diverse and varied ways that people 
communicate. 
3 We interpret “hearer” in this work broadly to represent all the diverse and varies ways that people receive 
communication. 
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level of hermeneutical injustice when there is a gap in the resources needed to allow a marginalized 
group to be heard (i.e., to contribute knowledge about their experiences). 
 In the following sections, we apply Fricker’s forms of epistemic injustice to examine the 
conditions for knowledge production within educational research and judgements about the credibility 
of people who use FC to convey knowledge about their experiences as nonspeaking autistic people. As 
we will discuss, in the case of FC, researchers’ commitment to a specific type of scientific validation as 
a prerequisite to believing the testimony of individuals who use FC creates a gap in hermeneutical 
resources, constituting a hermeneutical injustice. Additionally, research about FC includes making 
judgements about the credibility of the testimony of those who type to communicate. Making 
judgements about the credibility of testimony is necessary and not inherently harmful. Yet, a deliberate 
choice has been made among researchers to limit the conditions that might allow testimony to be 
“heard.” We argue that dismissal of the testimony of those who type to communicate on the basis that 
they do not meet those conditions, constitutes a form of testimonial injustice. We draw on examples of 
both types of epistemic injustice to understand the ways in which some arguments about FC obscure 
the epistemic agency of people who type to communicate through denials of credibility that hinge on 
and perpetuate hermeneutical gaps in collective resources. 
 
 
The Self-imposed Limitations of Education Research 
 
There are not many of us [people who type to communicate] in academia. Our stories and experiences might 
be dismissed as “just anecdotes” but this how we experience our progress, the changes FC brings to our lives, 
the day-to-day message-passing that we don’t need to record, report or have validated by every single Very 
Important People, usually privileged, non-disabled people, who call themselves “experts.” (Sequenzia, 2015) 
 
In the above quote, Amy Sequenzia (2015), an activist and author who types to communicate, 
highlights how people who type to communicate using FC are subject to having their experiences and 
communication dismissed by researchers. Sequenzia refers to how critics of FC view knowledge 
produced by individuals who type to communicate as “just anecdotes,” as opposed to legitimate 
evidence that can inform knowledge about FC and those who use it. Sequenzia’s concerns are those of 
marginalization from knowledge production, or what Fricker (2007) refers to as hermeneutical 
marginalization. Compared to those who Sequenzia refers to as “Very Important People” – mostly 
nondisabled researchers who hold status as experts – people who use FC have limited influence and 
participation in practices which could contribute to knowledge about the communication of individuals 
labelled with intellectual and developmental disabilities who do not use speech to communicate. As 
Fricker (ibid.) argues, marginalization from participation in the spread of knowledge is often the result 
of conditions that create a gap in the resources needed for a social group to render their experiences 
intelligible – and we would add in the case of FC, legitimate. 
 Sequenzia draws attention to epistemological conditions that facilitate the hermeneutical 
marginalization of people who use FC: the standard imposed on people who type to communicate to 
have their communication validated under certain conditions before their voices and experiences can 
be deemed authentic. Researchers critical of FC insist that testing using controlled message passing 
provides the only satisfactory conditions for proving the authorship of a person typing (Hemsley, et al., 
2018). These message-passing conditions involve tasks that require individuals who type to 
communicate to pass information unknown to their facilitator, often in instances in which typer and 
facilitator are unaware of whether they are seeing the same or different prompts. Other researchers and 
individuals who type to communicate have critiqued and demonstrated the barriers of the conditions of 
message-passing studies, namely that they may not account for differences in the relationship and 
training between facilitator and typer, nor the anxiety produced during unfamiliar, evaluative tasks, and 
the effect of these factors on the outcome of the research (Cardinal, Hanson, & Wakeham, 1996; 
Marcus & Shevin, 1997). In fact, when these methodological issues have been corrected for, some 
message-passing studies have demonstrated authenticity of communication through such tasks 





(Cardinal, Hanson, & Wakeham, 1996; Sheehan & Matuozzi, 1996; Weiss, Wagner, & Bauman, 1996). 
Further, other methodologies, such as eye tracking (Grayson, et al., 2012), lexical analysis of typed text 
(Tuzzi, 2009), and development of speech during typing (Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2001; Kasa-
Hendrickson, Broderick, & Hanson, 2009) have provided evidence to validate typed communication 
and to understand the influence that sensory and movement differences have on those who do or 
could use FC (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013). This work has raised tensions around interpreting 
performance on controlled tests as indicators of competence (Emerson, Grayson, & Griffiths, 2001). 
Yet the findings of these studies are not considered scientifically valid by critics of FC because the 
research methods do not rely on controlled message-passing tasks (Hemsley, et al., 2018). 
 Validating FC through message passing is a self-imposed requirement that aligns with a 
commitment towards empiricism in special education research and which limits the types of data that 
could provide evidence about the use of FC. Some researchers who have critiqued the use of FC as 
pseudoscientific have done so on the grounds that it does not meet the criteria of a scientifically valid 
and evidence-based practice (e.g., Mostert, 2014; Travers, 2017). Travers (2017) describes an evidence-
based practice as “an intervention that is more likely to confer benefit than an unproven intervention 
because it has been subjected to the most stringent scientific tests currently available” (p. 196). An 
evidence-based practice framework in special education has emerged following calls to orient the field 
towards empiricism in research, what Kauffman and Sasso (2006) describe as a “dedication to finding a 
single truth as objectively as possible” (p. 111). Disability studies scholars, such as Gallagher (2004; 
2006), have questioned the possibility of finding objective truths in researching disability and education 
practices, on the grounds that theory and research procedures are never value free, and that the very 
disability categories used to group and study people are themselves subjective. Nevertheless, the 
empirically based framework of evidenced-based practices has become the predominant 
epistemological orientation in the field of special education research. For example, the Council for 
Exceptional Children (Cook, et al., 2014), the largest professional organization for special education in 
the United States, uses evidenced-based practices as the standard for choosing effective practices, 
thereby limiting acceptable evidence to quantitative research. Qualitative research is not mentioned, as 
it does not fit within the guidelines or criteria of evidenced-based practices. 
  It is important to recognize that the criteria for validating communication advocated by some 
researchers is not inevitable, but self-imposed, and then extrapolated to cast doubt about the testimony 
of all people who type to communicate. The fact that FC users have not consistently demonstrated 
authorship under message-passing conditions, coupled with early findings indicating the potential for 
facilitator influence on messages under those conditions, is taken to mean that anyone who uses FC 
must not be authoring their own ideas. Travers (2017) further argues that, given that FC has been 
deemed ineffective according to this kind of scientific testing, it is unethical to teach people to use FC. 
Travers, et al. (2014) go as far as to claim that “FC is unequivocally and universally damaging to people 
with disabilities individually and as a group” (p. 196), a claim that, ironically, has not (and almost 
certainly cannot) be empirically verified. Thus, researchers draw on a commitment to scientific 
validation as grounds for judging the authenticity of communication produced by individuals who type 
to communicate, and making recommendations for whether they should have access to FC at all. Such 
conclusions reflect a concern raised by Danforth (1997) that a singular commitment to empirical 
science in special education research could unduly limit educational practices by imposing a standard 
that practices should be chosen only after being scientifically verified. 
 Researchers have further used self-imposed criteria for validating FC as the basis for dismissing 
research that informs how and if FC is used. For example, Hemsley, et al. (2018) conducted a 
systematic review of FC studies from 2014 to 2018. The authors found three recent qualitative research 
studies (Ashby, et al., 2015; Wilson, et al., 2014; Woodfield, Jung, & Ashby, 2014), but excluded them 
on the grounds that their review was limited to identifying studies that first tested message passing. 
Findings of the excluded research studies offer insights into the practice of, and skills required for, 
fading support (Ashby, et al., 2015; Wilson, et al., 2014); training new facilitators (Woodfield, Jung, & 
Ashby, 2014); and nuances of conditions under which independence is possible (Ashby, et al., 2015). 
Each of these studies included data from produced by people who type to communicate. Because these 
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studies did not first validate authorship using a controlled message-passing test, they were dismissed 
from contributing to knowledge about FC. 
  Another example of how contributions to knowledge are obscured from the collective 
understanding about autism and communication is by discrediting as evidence research that cites 
qualitative data from people who type or spell to communicate. Vyse, et al. (2019) questioned the 
conclusions of an article by Jaswal and Akhtar (2019) on the grounds that the authors included 
quotations and citations from individuals who use FC and rapid prompting method (RPM), a related 
methodology used to teach access to spelling for education and communication. Jaswal and Akhtar 
(2019) argued that their findings should question the assumption in psychology that autism is a deficit 
in social motivation. However, Vyse, et al. (2019) asserted that because the authors used quotes from 
individuals who use FC and RPM to communicate as evidence in their research, “the credibility of their 
arguments is seriously compromised” (para 1). Such exclusions are of particular consequence given that 
past evidence from qualitative research has pointed to potential flaws in the very conditions critics 
suggest for testing FC, and has contributed knowledge about the experiences of people who do type to 
communicate. Cardinal and Falvey (2014) point out that research in the decades since early message-
passing studies has revealed a pattern of more naturalistic, qualitative studies (over 100) and fewer 
quantitative studies (approximately 40). They note: 
 
This may demonstrate that researchers have come to recognize that they learn much more about the 
process of FC through qualitative, as compared with quantitative research. Where nearly all 
quantitative research has been focused on the efficacy of FC, research using qualitative methods of 
inquiry have focused more on the systematic development of the method, searching for what works 
best, for whom and the conditions thereof.” (p. 190) 
 
Yet, within the self-imposed criteria of scientific validation, qualitative research is not recognized as 
evidence. Williams (2020) argues that the dismissal of qualitative research as amounting to anecdotes, 
rather than legitimate evidence in support of FC, relies on “rhetorics of evacuation” that take away 
from the experiences, possibilities, and tensions raised by people who have learned to type to 
communicate through FC (p. 222). A salient consequence of such evacuation is to perpetuate the 
“literate invisibility” of people who type to communicate, by discounting the very evidence that would 
demand an acknowledgment of their literacy (Kliewer, Biklen, & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006, p. 167). 
 Claims about FC as being a “pseudoscientific treatment” (Tostanoski, et al., 2014, p. 220), 
“therapeutic quackery” (Travers & Ayers, 2015, p. 371), and a “fad treatment” (Wombles, 2014, p. 
181), are thus made possible by systematically discounting certain forms of evidence, and lived 
experiences, that support the use of FC. We argue that the self-imposed conditions set by researchers 
to justify evacuating from, or willfully disregarding, the knowledge produced by individuals who use FC 
rises to the level of perpetuating hermeneutical injustice. People who type to communicate have a 
vested interest in having their voices heard, yet their attempts to communicate knowledge about their 
experiences are dismissed, owing to a lack of resources in the current conditions of knowledge 
production that would allow their communication to be rendered intelligible. These injustices grow out 
of and perpetuate the hermeneutical gap in resources available to understand the experiences and 
possibilities of nonspeaking autistic people. 
 In the next section, we examine how researchers use a self-imposed standard for scientifically 
validated communication as a means to delegitimize the published testimony of autistic people who 
type to communicate. We argue that a denial of the testimony of individuals who type to communicate 
constitutes epistemic injustice that limits options for communication access of current and future 
autistic people who do not use speech to communicate, and discounts evidence that challenges ableist 










Epistemic Injustice in Denying the Credibility of Testimony 
 
I am so ready to let the world know that they are all wrong about autism. Yes, I am autistic. It’s a part of 
me. A hard way to be in this world with a certain perspective. Many people dread the idea that we could 
actually exist in many numbers, because no one visualizes us this way, with thinking minds intact. Having a 
voice leaves hard questions for people to answer. People do not want to think that they have been so wrong for 
so long, which makes it hard to really see me, and others like me. Day in and day out I deal with all of these 
challenges. Believe me, I get it why people have such a hard time with this. All I ask is that you try to have 
an open mind to ideas that defy existing ones. (Barmache, 2019, p. 95) 
 
To “have an open mind to ideas that defy existing ones,” as Dillan Barmache, an advocate and author 
who types to communicate, urges, requires a critical evaluation of the questions being asked and the 
methods used to answer them. In contrast to special education scholars who situate their work within 
the paradigm of empirical science, many researchers in the field of disability studies in education have 
embraced qualitative methodologies to offer interpretive resources with which people identified with 
disabilities can have greater participation in producing research and knowledge based on their lived 
experiences. Much of these efforts are born out of a recognition of the hermeneutical marginalization 
that we have discussed, and the need to create resources to promote epistemic agency, particularly for 
those labelled and regarded as intellectually disabled (Ashby, 2011; Taylor, 2018). Baglieri, et al. (2011) 
describe researchers in disability studies in education as “taking great care that we do not use research 
as a means of excluding the voices of people with disabilities … [Rather] we aim to use research as a 
vehicle for their voices so that they can tell their own stories and share their own goals, aspirations, and 
needs” (p. 273). The reach of such efforts may be limited, however, if the voices of people with 
disabilities are dismissed as not credible, and the individuals are perceived to not have the capacity to 
interpret their own experiences. As we have shown, people who use facilitated communication face 
judgements of deficits in their credibility. These judgements may rise to the level of testimonial injustice 
when they are the result of prejudice that unduly undercuts the credibility of communication at an 
individual level. 
 In several instances, scholars have attempted to support the epistemic agency of people 
labelled as intellectually disabled and who type to communicate by co-constructing research with them. 
However, critics of FC have questioned, or in some cases dismissed, the testimony of people who use 
FC in published work. For example, articles by Biklen and Burke (2006) and Rubin, et al. (2001) are co-
authored by Burke and by Rubin, two autistic people who learned to type to communicate 
independently using FC and who have at one point, prior to having access to communication, been 
either labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled. This research puts forth ideas for rethinking 
approaches to schooling for individuals identified with intellectual and developmental disabilities 
(Biklen & Burke, 2006), and questions prevailing notions of intelligence and competence (Rubin, et al., 
2001). On the grounds that the co-authors who type to communicate have not had their authorship 
scientifically verified under message-passing conditions, critics have discredited their testimony and 
excluded these contributions to the study of schooling and the construction of intelligence. One of the 
ways that the credibility of typers’ testimony is denied is through use of language that casts doubt on 
their contributions by nature of how they were produced. For example, Travers and Ayers (2015) 
express both skepticism and outright dismissal of the authenticity of Burke’s and Rubin’s published 
ideas, based on their identities as autistic authors who type to communicate. They first cast doubt on 
Burke’s and Rubin’s contributions by referring to Burke as “a person with autism who reads aloud 
messages attributed to him generated via FC,” and to Rubin, et al.’s article as including “statements 
generated via FC and attributed to Rubin” (p. 373–374). When discussing Biklen and Burke’s (2006) 
article, Travers and Ayers (2015) write that Burke “allegedly offers his insight about the ideal school” in 
the article. In their most direct denial of Burke’s contributions to research, the authors assert that given 
that FC is not considered scientifically valid, “we must conclude that words attributed to Burke are not 
reflective of his own true thoughts, opinions, or experiences; they instead represent the subconscious 
thoughts of his facilitator(s)” (p. 373). Importantly, Travers and Ayers (ibid.) offer no empirical 
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evidence for their conclusion that Burke and Rubin did not author their own thoughts, and further, 
disregard documentation of their independent typing. The fact that they have not proven their 
authorship by undergoing a controlled message-passing test is evidently sufficient for the authors to 
conclude that the testimony is not credible. 
Outside of academic research, autistic people, including those who type to communicate, have 
documented their experiences in popular media, often in resistance to and in ways that reflect their 
marginalization from educational and social institutions. Published autobiographies, documentary films, 
and blogging continue to be mechanisms through which the autistic and neurodivergent community, 
disability justice community scholars, and disability rights activists push back against the 
marginalization of their knowledge in research and practice about their lives. However, in academic 
discourse, scholars opposed to FC have discredited testimony in media by people who type to 
communicate. For example, Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) question the authenticity of The Reason I Jump: The 
Inner Voice of a Thirteen-Year-Old Boy with Autism (2013), a best-selling book written by Naoki Higashida 
and translated by David Mitchell that describes the first-person experiences, preferences, and opinions 
of an autistic adolescent who types to communicate. Higashida reported initially receiving physical 
support by his mother in his writing, later learning to type independently. Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) assert 
that it is “difficult to evaluate” claims that Higashida types independently “without videotaped footage, 
which is unavailable as of this writing” (p. 83). “Moreover,” the authors write, “there is at present no 
scientific documentation of Higashida’s achievements” (p. 72). Lilienfeld, et al. (ibid.) do not clarify 
what comprises independence, what they refer to as “achievements,” nor what constitutes sufficient 
“scientific documentation” that would grant Higashida testimonial credibility. 
 While critics of FC most often link their critiques to the language of scientific evidence, Lilienfeld, 
et al. (ibid.) also draw upon their personal observations to question the authenticity of the voices of 
individuals who type to communicate. At one point, the authors discuss the documentary film Wretches 
and Jabberers (Wurzburg, 2010), which chronicles the journey of two autistic men in their efforts to 
change attitudes about autism and competence. The film stars Larry Bissonnette and Tracy Thresher, 
two individuals who type to communicate with support from facilitators. The authors proceed to 
question the authenticity of Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s communication through their responses to 
the film, by recounting personal observations: 
 
The third author of this article (J.T.T.) has seen Thresher on two occasions in 2005 and 2008, and 
interacted directly with Bissonnette, including having lunch with him without his facilitator, never 
once witnessing him either type or communicate independently in a cognitively sophisticated 
manner. In contrast, Thresher can speak and can read what is produced for him by his facilitator’s 
intervention, raising questions concerning why he requires FC to communicate. (p. 82) 
 
This passage serves to cast doubt on Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s ability to communicate authentically, 
and bleeds into commentary about Bissonnette’s perceived intelligence, both of which serve to deny 
their testimonial credibility. The third author’s observations during lunch with Bissonnette, for which 
the context is not described, are submitted as evidence that Bissonnette is not “cognitively 
sophisticated” (no criteria for this evaluation are provided). The two occasions in which the author 
“has seen Thresher” (the setting is not mentioned) speak and read aloud his typed text are then used to 
question why Thresher otherwise requires support to communicate. Bissonnette is thus portrayed as 
not capable of the complex thoughts he communicates in Wretches and Jabberers, and Thresher is 
characterized as either too capable to really need to use FC, or not capable of his own thoughts if what 
he read and spoke is assumed to be the thoughts of his facilitator. The authors’ inclusion of anecdotal 
evidence to question the authenticity of Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s thoughts is striking when 
considered alongside the authors’ earlier dismissal of qualitative data and first-person perspectives as 
being too “anecdotal” to be considered evidence of credible communication through typing (p. 70). 
The influence of prejudicial assumptions on credibility and competence are apparent when the 
third author in the article by Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) evaluates Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s capacities to 
communicate during a meal (Bissonnette) and at an undisclosed distance (Thresher). The third author’s 





description of Bissonnette as not appearing “sophisticated” appeals to common sense ideas about 
intelligence and implies that Bissonnette does not have the capacity to produce knowledge. Further, the 
evidence submitted raises the question: if the third author had seen evidence of “cognitively 
sophisticated” communication at lunch, would this “anecdotal” evidence then call into question the 
premise of the authors’ arguments that FC is scientifically invalid? Such casual judgements demonstrate 
how claims about disability using the language of scientific objectivity become interconnected with 
prejudiced assumptions and appeals to common sense. As Samuels (2014) argues, (dis)ability is often 
constructed through a diagnostic gaze that invokes both elements of scientific discourse and shared 
cultural understandings of what constitutes (dis)ability and (in)competence. Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) rely 
on cultural constructions of independence and competence to privilege their own experiences and 
judgements as legitimate while having previously dismissed similar forms of evidence from people who 
use FC. 
Together, the examples above illustrate a pattern in how the testimony of those who use FC is 
discredited on an individual basis. This denial of credibility amounts to testimonial injustice in that the 
judgements of critics depend upon identity prejudice – in this case, presumptions about the capabilities 
of nonspeaking autistic people whose communication challenges conceptions of competence. While 
critics cite the authors’ methods of communication as a justification for dismissing their testimony, 
their arguments are implicitly rooted in disabled-mindedness, hinging on deficit-based constructions of 
autistic people who do not use speech as their primary mode of communication. Namely, the fact that 
authors have been labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled and also type to communicate, creates 
the default assumption that they are incompetent and not credible until they prove their credibility 
under conditions that satisfy researchers. Such critiques of the contributions of individuals who use FC 
employ a standard for accepting their epistemic agency that goes beyond what people who speak to 
communicate are held to.  
Further, the dismissal of testimony at the individual level is supported by elements of 
hermeneutical injustice, which we previously discussed. Critics refer to the criteria for scientific 
validation through message passing as a prerequisite, and the only satisfactory evidence, that would 
allow them to deem the authors’ testimony to be credible. When the authors do not meet these 
conditions for evidence, researchers, one by one, discount their published testimony. Thus people who 
type to communicate are denied epistemic agency and excluded from contributing knowledge about 
their capabilities and about the marginalization that they experience. The researchers’ self-imposed 
criteria serve to “evacuate” knowledge (Williams, 2020) that could, and otherwise does, contribute to 
the collective understanding about autism, intellectual disability, and communication. This is 
particularly consequential when the knowledge that is dismissed could, and does, call into question 
accepted theories of autism and intellectual disability, and challenges ableist constructions of 
communication, intelligence, and competence. Rather than being understood as informants, the 
background conditions (i.e., self-imposed criteria for credible testimony) hinder the attempts of 
individuals who use FC to make their experiences intelligible. 
To this point, we have argued that the self-imposed conditions for evidence of authentic 
communication of people who type to communicate, and the use of such criteria as grounds to 
individually discredit their testimony of their lived experiences, constitutes epistemic injustice. Autistic 
people who use FC are repeatedly marginalized and deemed not credible in their attempts to contribute 
knowledge of their experiences. This pattern reflects residual prejudice towards nonspeaking autistic 
people who type to communicate, owing to their identities and modes of communication, which 
facilitates their epistemic exclusion. Disrupting forms of epistemic injustice require an adjustment on 
the part of hearers (receivers of communication), or what Fricker (2007) refers to as a corrective virtue 
based on an awareness of the prejudicial conditions faced by individuals in their attempts to 
communicate. 
 In the next section, we examine the notion of presuming competence, an idea that has emerged in 
response to prejudice faced by people labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled, including 
presumptions of their incompetence. We consider the potential for presumption of competence as a 
virtue for correcting against epistemic injustice in both research and everyday practice. 
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Presuming Competence and Epistemic (In)justice 
 
Even though my friends and I possess intelligent ideas, the people in the educational system for the most part 
have historically not understood how to educate us. Teaching kids, parents, and teachers is one of my goals. I 
want to plot out the path toward training teachers to look at their students with a wide lens of possibility. 
The lens is the way to see the pupil’s intelligence that is always there but sometimes has difficulty coming out 
through communication. It is imperative that educators think about presuming competence and look for ways 
to see the intelligence in all of us. The student should not have to prove they are capable of learning. The 
school needs to provide the educational experiences to teach the student literacy, communication, and skills to 
be a learner. (Thresher, 2019, p. 39) 
 
Countering epistemic injustices requires virtues that correct for the influence of the prejudice that 
underlies and facilitates credibility judgements; this necessitates “virtuous hearers” who listen (i.e., 
receive communication) in particular ways (Fricker, 2007). In the case of testimonial injustices, the 
virtuous hearer engages in critical reflexivity that confronts the possibility that low credibility 
judgements grow out of prejudice, and adjusts to compensate “to reach the degree of credibility that 
would have been given were it not for the prejudice” (ibid., p. 92). In the case of correcting for 
hermeneutical injustice, the virtuous hearer must have a heightened awareness of how a gap in 
hermeneutical resources may contribute to reducing the intelligibility of a communicator’s attempts to 
convey knowledge, and therefore either adjust or suspend credibility judgements (ibid.). Thus, building 
on one another, both testimonial justice and hermeneutical justice require active, corrective virtues on 
the part of the receiver of communication that seek to neutralize the impact of identity prejudice in 
exchanges with communicators. In this section, we describe the presumption of competence as a virtue 
of both kinds – hermeneutical and testimonial – with which to correct for epistemic injustices 
experienced by nonspeaking autistic people who type to communicate. Growing out of educational 
practice, the presumption of competence has corrective possibilities both within exchanges between 
interlocutors and within the constructions of disability in academic research that impacts the 
hermeneutical resources on communicative access and experiences. 
 The presumption of competence is a principle of approaching people, particularly students with 
disabilities, in which educators: 
 
Assume that a child has intellectual ability, provide opportunities to be exposed to learning, assume the 
child wants to learn and assert him or herself in the world. To not presume competence is to assume that 
some individuals cannot learn, develop, or participate in the world. Presuming competence is nothing less 
than a Hippocratic oath for educators. It is a framework that says, approach each child as wanting to be 
fully included, wanting acceptance and appreciation, wanting to learn, wanting to be heard, wanting to 
contribute. By presuming competence, educators place the burden on themselves to come up with ever 
more creative, innovative ways for individuals to learn. (Biklen, 2012) 
 
The concept of presuming competence has evolved out of a history of research and practice rooted in 
a commitment to studying disability as a complex sociocultural phenomenon, rather than as the 
individual deficit that it is represented as in discourse (Biklen & Burke, 2006). Bogdan and Taylor 
(1976) discussed “a concept of intelligence [grounded in] human dimensions,” and later the “social 
construction of humanness” (1989) in relationships between people with and without disabilities. 
Goode (1994) used the “emic” perspective in similar ways to which Linneman (2001) later 
characterized attributions of “mindedness” as contextual and relational. 
 To resist the educational consequences of presumed incompetence, Donnellan (1984) developed 
the “criterion of the least dangerous assumption … [which] holds that in the absence of conclusive 
data, educational decisions ought to be based on assumptions which, if incorrect, will have the least 
dangerous effect on the student” (p. 142). Scholars and practitioners alike have taken up Donnellan’s 
criterion as a socially just lens for approaching the education and support of students with disabilities 





with complex communication needs, positioning the act of presuming competence as the least 
dangerous assumption in educational contexts (Jorgensen, 2005; Jorgensen, McSheehan, & 
Sonnenmeier, 2007). The presumption of competence has been primarily located in educational 
research and practice in response to the experiences of people with intellectual and developmental 
disability labels, including autism, who, when securing access to communication training and associated 
supports, demonstrate capabilities previously unexpected of them (Rubin, et al., 2001). 
 We consider presuming competence to be a response to epistemic injustice that occurs when a 
prejudice on the part of a receiver of communication clouds their ability to receive a communicator’s 
words (Fricker, 2007). The notion of presuming competence is espoused with the intention of 
countering how people with disabilities have been regarded, educated, and (mis)understood, as a result 
of beliefs that link the ability to speak and move reliably with the ability to think (Biklen & Kliewer, 
2006; Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006). Countering such ableist ideas involves transcending 
constructions of intelligence predicated on expectations for reliable verbal speech and motor planning 
(Ashby, 2010; Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006; Donnellan, Hill & Leary, 2013), and broadening 
notions of competence and conceptions of modalities through which competence can be demonstrated 
(Ashby, 2011). With its intention to counter prejudicial beliefs and practices, we can conceive of 
presuming competence as a sort of corrective virtue in the face of epistemic injustice. Scholars’ 
description of presuming competence demonstrates a critical, reflective openness on the part of the 
receiver of communication to the possibility of credibility on the part of the communicator (in this 
case, a nonspeaking autistic person who types to communicate). Further, correcting for prejudice 
requires an awareness on the part of the hearer about the social theories, or generalizations that they 
have come to internalize about a social group, and which may influence their judgements of credibility. 
For example, Kliewer, Biklen, & Petersen (2015) describe presuming competence as requiring a 
“suspension of a deficit ideology” that is commonly held towards autistic people labelled or regarded as 
intellectually disabled. Biklen and Burke (2006) write that to presume competence is “not to project an 
ableist interpretation on something another person does but rather to presume there must be a 
rationale or sympathetic explanation for what someone does and then to try to discover it, always from 
the other person’s own perspective” (p. 168). Presuming competence thus counters the disabled-
mindness and ableism that underlies credibility judgements about nonspeaking autistic people who type 
to communicate, and encourages hearers to offset the impact of prejudice within such judgements. 
 There is also evidence that such a virtue can and has aided in increasing opportunities for 
epistemic agency and constructing more “inclusive hermeneutical micro-climates” – contexts in which 
the marginalization of the communicator is acknowledged by the hearer, and identity prejudice is 
corrected for (Fricker, 2007, p. 171). Collaborative research with people who type to communicate is an 
example of efforts to construct such a context (e.g., Biklen & Burke, 2006; Rubin, et al., 2001). 
Research that has moved beyond presumptions of incompetence in people who do not use reliable 
speech to communicate has generated new understanding about the neurological, motor, and sensory 
differences that contribute to barriers to communication, particularly for nonspeaking autistic people 
(Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013; Torres, et al., 2013). In other words, the often unacknowledged 
challenges of organizing and regulating one’s body in response to sensory and movement demands (i.e., 
those required for speech or independent pointing) are becoming more widely understood as the 
underlying experiences of actions and behaviours associated with autism that are too often 
(mis)interpreted (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013) – or, as Biklen (2005) writes: “the problem is not one 
of understanding, but of doing” (p. 267). Upholding an ethic of presuming competence has allowed 
research to begin to methodologically account for the experiences that autistic people have reported for 
decades. This process serves as a model for actively seeking out, centering, and honouring the 
epistemic agency of nonspeaking autistic people by aligning their reported experiences with study 
aimed at understanding and supporting – not fixing. This work serves as an exemplar of the conditions 
necessary for research to counter epistemic injustice. For people who use FC specifically, the growing 
understanding of sensory and motor differences, augmented by documented first-person perspectives 
and neuroscience, has implications for better understanding the need for dynamic, individualized 
approaches to support, how to most effectively fade that support over time, and what other strategies 
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(i.e., to support sensory, movement, organization, and emotional regulation) could further augment 
communication. This knowledge offers an example of new meanings that emerge that fill a 
hermeneutical gap when research methods centre and align with experiences of people who have access 
to alternative forms of communication to reduce the effects of hermeneutical marginalization. This 
work makes clear that a presumption of competence also involves understanding the role of sensory, 
motor, and neurological differences, or other experiences that cannot be observed, and honouring 
autistic ways of being in correcting for epistemic injustice. 
  
Virtuous or Irresponsible: Critiques of the Presumption of Competence 
 
Critics of FC have critiqued the notion of presuming competence, asserting that it is anything but 
virtuous. In their discussion of presuming competence, Travers and Ayers (2015) argue that 
encouraging practitioners (e.g., teachers) to presume competence itself leads to prejudice, and that the 
position should be dismissed in favour of professional objectivity. They assert: “Effective teachers do 
not rely on prejudiced decision-making processes and instead rely on objective measures of student 
performance to determine whether students have learned” (ibid., p. 378). The authors later conclude 
that: “The responsible position is to suspend judgment about the person’s competence and insist on 
sound (i.e., reliable, valid, verifiable) and objective evidence” (p. 384). Travers and Ayers’s 
recommendation to form judgements based on objective evidence could be understood as its own 
corrective epistemic virtue, intended to correct for the potential for what Fricker (2007) refers to as 
credibility excess. In other words, Travers and Ayers (2015) take the position that the presumption of 
competence could lead professionals to perceive capacities in people labelled or regarded as 
intellectually disabled that are not really there, thus lending an unduly high credibility to their 
communication. 
 To consider if Travers and Ayers’s (2015) position could correct for potential epistemic injustice, 
we should ask whether presuming nothing about an individual’s capabilities and making a judgement 
based on an objective interpretation of data is possible, or desirable. First, returning to Fricker (2007), a 
key force behind testimonial injustice is that receivers of communication are influenced by 
generalizations about groups within the collective imagination of their social context. This leads to 
“residual prejudices” that influence initial judgements of people’s credibility (p. 89). Indeed, researchers 
within the field of disability studies have frequently cast doubt on the possibility that, within the 
cultural, historical, and political context that imbues disability with meaning, nondisabled people could 
have a non-prejudicial view of people identified with disabilities. As Clare (2017) argues, the term 
“mental retardation,” the former label used to refer to intellectual disability, reflects assumptions about 
people’s capacities and comes with expectations and stereotypes. “The diagnosis of mental 
retardation,” Clare asserts, “is often dangerous, sometimes useful, but never neutral, never merely 
descriptive” (p. 42). Similarly, Yergeau (2018) examines the various ways that the lives of autistic people 
have already been “authored,” within the discourses of scientific research and wider culture, including 
by portraying autistic people as lacking certain human capacities (p. 141). 
 Clare (2017) and Yergeau (2018) point to how the very foundation and history of disability labels 
are entangled with assumptions of deficits in competence that foster prejudice regarding the identity 
(i.e., labels) of autism and intellectual disability. Importantly, as these authors argue, the construction of 
intellectual disability and autism as deficits is often based on putatively “objective” data (i.e., 
intelligence testing that requires reliable speech and motor control). Such data are written into 
educational documents that become institutional biographies of children, serving as the sources of the 
objective data that Travers and Ayers (2015) endorse as the foundation for forming judgements about a 
child’s competence. In doing so, the authors appear unaware of the pervasiveness of ableism, through 
both prejudice and deficit-based scientific constructions of disability, in “authoring” (Yergeau, 2018, p. 
141) a professional judgement about people labelled as intellectually disabled. Returning to Taylor’s 
(2021) notion of disabled-mindedness, people labelled as intellectually disabled are already subject to 
being treated as having a deficiency in their capacity as knowers in educational contexts, owing to the 
presumption that their deficit-based labels reflect objective facts, as opposed to interpretations based 





on limited understandings and prejudice towards atypical communication. That the authors imagine a 
world in which able-bodied and able-minded professionals can, and do, routinely engage with people 
identified as disabled without prejudice is ironic in the context of critiquing the presumption of 
competence; were such an ableist-free culture to exist, there would be no need for a virtue of 
presuming competence to begin with, and thus no critique of the concept by the authors would have 
been made. 
 Travers and Ayers (2015) also dismiss the usefulness of the presumption of competence on the 
basis that there is no evidence of its efficacy. In arguing that presuming competence should not be 
promoted, the authors point out that “no empirical research on PC [presuming competence] has been 
conducted to substantiate the claim it preserves dignity” (p. 371). Further, they submit that “no 
published experimental study of PC is available in professional literature. Thus, there exists no evidence 
to support PC as a practical idea” (p. 374). The authors’ demand for empirical proof of what happens 
when people (i.e., teachers) presume competence is consistent with the expectation of scientific testing 
for endorsing practices as evidence based. In other words, the authors treat an ethical position and 
philosophy for guiding action as a practice, or intervention, that must be evaluated to determine causal 
effect. Returning to our earlier discussion, such a position imposes a demand for certain types of 
evidence as determined by researchers. The demand for empirical validation to endorse an ethical 
position raises concerns over the role of researchers in limiting the diversity of efforts to resist social 
exclusion and discrimination. Such a standard runs the risk of privileging scientific rationality over 





I worry about the future of autistic people who type. I wonder if there will be any advancement with research. 
I hope that there will be more inclusion and acceptance that autism does not automatically mean – can’t, 
won’t, or doesn’t. There is a saying in the disabilities community, “Nothing about us, without us.” A 
complete rethinking about autism and autistic neurology is needed if special education schools or any schools 
are going to educate those of us who think differently. Believing in the potential of all students is not on any 
test. The presumption that each and every student, whether they can speak or not, can and will eventually 
learn given the necessary supports and encouragement is not common, but it should be. (Zurcher-Long, 
2019, 142) 
 
The treatment of facilitated communication in research literature raises an epistemological quandary: a 
practice that is not validated by what researchers deem as necessary scientific testing is nevertheless 
essential in contributing to the epistemic agency of people who, because of their ways of being, 
thinking, moving, and communicating, have been historically and hermeneutically marginalized from 
participating in knowledge production. Our analysis calls into question whether the self-imposed 
limitations for producing knowledge that some researchers call for render educational research 
incapable of both facilitating access to communication for people labelled or regarded as intellectually 
disabled and providing consumers with knowledge that demonstrates the competence of such 
individuals. Specifically, the use of self-imposed limitations to justify the dismissing of testimony 
impedes efforts to convey knowledge that counters contemporary assumptions about the autistic 
experience and the treatment of disabled people as epistemic outsiders. These conditions serve to 
eclipse the voices of individuals who type to communicate in ways that constitute an epistemic injustice 
by denying their contributions to knowledge and setting a goal post, determined by professionals who 
simultaneously discount other evidence that informs the use of FC, that disabled people must meet 
before being deemed credible. Additionally, these conditions serve to limit the choice of 
communication options available to people for whom they may be most appropriate. Nonspeaking 
people cannot afford to continually wait for increased opportunities to “prove their membership” as 
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literate and competent citizens amidst restrictive notions of what counts as acceptable evidence of their 
communicated knowledge and experiences (Kliewer, Biklen, & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006, p. 187). 
 If research about nonspeaking autistic people labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled is not 
up to the task of facilitating epistemic agency, it is necessary to consider alternative conditions for 
knowledge production that can dismantle, rather than perpetuate, forms of epistemic injustice. 
Virtuous behaviour at the level of individual encounters (i.e., by presuming competence) may aid in 
supporting a critical openness towards alternative forms of communication, and reduce instances of 
credibility deficits. However, the impact may be limited without addressing the ways that nonspeaking 
autistic people are marginalized to begin with, through a gap in hermeneutical resources needed to 
allow them to inform the world of their own experiences and ways of communicating. To provide the 
epistemic conditions in which such people can be recognized as “knowledge citizens” (Taylor, 2018), 
researchers must not outright discredit their testimony, even when it challenges current conceptions of 
what counts as evidence. This will involve applying the same skepticism towards self-imposed 
limitations on producing knowledge that is invoked by critics when discussing FC. Such skepticism 
towards a singular commitment to empirical science would recognize that multiple methods are needed 
to understand a phenomenon, and that the conclusions of researchers, even a consensus, are always 
temporal. 
 Moreover, we argue that researchers should reorient their efforts to seeking ways to promote 
epistemic agency, particularly given the evident risk of epistemic injustice in failing to do so. This 
requires an active acknowledgement that methodological decisions, by definition, have consequences 
on knowledge production (Dindar, Lindblom, & Kärnä, 2017). Thus, such decisions must be made in 
collaboration with members of the community in which the research is situated. To do so requires 
conditions that create parallels between designing collaborative inquiry across communicative and 
neurocognitive diversity, and building communication support partnerships (such as those developed in 
FC). In both contexts, trust and agency are paramount epistemic conditions that are antithetical to the 
current search for evidence that relies upon deficit constructions of disability. Rather, methodologies 
and methods that “center and reclaim disability” (Lester & Nusbaum, 2017) can align to enhance 
participation in knowledge production. Such collaborative efforts involve the virtuous approach of 
constructing hermeneutically inclusive micro-climates (Fricker, 2007) through which new knowledge 
can be created and disseminated to fill the hermeneutical gap that exists around experiences and 
possibilities of nonspeaking autistic people who do, or could, type to communicate. This work not only 
challenges who engages in research and how, but also what forms research processes take, ideally 
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